J Infect Dis by Wassilak, Steven G.F. et al.
Progress toward Global Interruption of Wild Poliovirus 
Transmission, 2010–2013 and Tackling the Challenges to 
Complete Eradication
Steven G.F. Wassilak, MD1, M. Steven Oberste, PhD1, Rudolph H. Tangermann, MD2, 
Ousmane M. Diop, PhD2, Hamid S. Jafari, MD2, and Gregory L. Armstrong, MD1
1Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA USA 2World Health Organization, 
Geneva, Switzerland
Abstract
Despite substantial progress, global polio eradication has remained elusive. Indigenous wild 
poliovirus (WPV) transmission in four endemic countries (Afghanistan, India, Nigeria, and 
Pakistan) persisted into 2010 and outbreaks from imported WPV continued. By 2013, most 
outbreaks in the interim were promptly controlled. The number of polio-affected districts globally 
has declined by74% (from 481 in 2009 to 126 in 2013), including a 79% decrease in the number 
of affected districts in endemic countries (from 304 to 63). India is now polio-free. The challenges 
to success in the remaining polio-endemic countries include 1) threats to the security of 
vaccinators in each country and a ban on polio vaccination in areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan; 
2) a risk of decreased government commitment; and 3) remaining surveillance gaps. Coordinated 
efforts under the International Health Regulations and efforts to mitigate the challenges provide a 
clear opportunity to soon secure global eradication.
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INTRODUCTION
Following the 1988 World Health Assembly (WHA) resolution to eradicate polio worldwide 
by 2000 [1], Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) efforts led to a 99% reduction from 
350,000 estimated polio cases in 1988 to fewer than 1000 confirmed cases in 2001 [2, 3]. 
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The number of endemic countries that had never interrupted indigenous wild poliovirus 
(WPV) transmission was reduced to 10 by 2001 (Figure 1; see Box 1 for definitions). The 
World Health Organization (WHO) regions of the Americas and the Western Pacific were 
certified polio-free in 1994 and 2000 respectively, and the European Region in 2002. No 
WPV type 2 (WPV2) cases have been detected since 1999 [4]. By 2006, the number of 
endemic countries decreased to four—Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, and Nigeria (Figure 1) 
[3, 5]; transmission had been interrupted in countries experiencing civil conflict and social 
disruption, such as Angola and Somalia. The remaining endemic countries had limited 
health infrastructure and suboptimal implementation of supplementary immunization 
activities (SIAs). More oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) doses appeared to be needed to raise 
population immunity where malnutrition and enteric diseases were highly prevalent [6, 7].
Box 1
Definitions Used by the Global Polio Eradication Initiative
Active transmission Detection of ≥1 WPV case or of WPV isolated from ≥2 environmental 
samples collected >1 month apart. The end of active transmission in a 
previously polio- free country is the lack of isolation of WPV from 
environmental samples or humans for 6 months; in a country with endemic 
or reestablished transmission, the end of active transmission is no WPV 
cases/isolation for 12 months.
Endemic transmission Circulation of indigenous WPV without interruption.
Importation event Detection of ≥1 WPV case or ≥1 isolation from sewage in a country 
previously polio-free for which genomic sequences most closely match WPV 
actively circulating in another country (exporting WPV).
Importation outbreak Detection of ≥1 WPV case secondary to ≥1 importation event.
Indigenous WPV WPV that has historically been circulating in a defined geographic area of a 
unique genotype (>15% nucleotide difference) or cluster (>5% nucleotide 
difference).
Polio-free country No evidence of indigenous WPV transmission for ≥1 year and subsequent 
WPV cases are determined to be due to WPV of external origin by genomic 
sequence analysis.
Prompt outbreak control Status when the last identified genetically-linked WPV case is detected 
within 6 months of laboratory confirmation of the outbreak.
Reestablished transmission Detection in a previously polio-free country of transmission of the same 
WPV lineage persisting for ≥12 months from onset of the first case following 
WPV importation to onset of the most recent case.
Reintroduction of monovalent oral poliovirus vaccines (mOPV) against types 1 (mOPV1) 
and 3 (mOPV3) improved per-dose effectiveness against the relevant serotype compared 
with trivalent OPV (tOPV) [8–10]. Predominant mOPV1 use in SIAs in some endemic 
countries beginning in 2005–2006—to preferentially target WPV type 1 (WPV1)—had 
substantial impact on WPV1 transmission but did not interrupt circulation [3, 11]. 
Resurgence in WPV type 3 (WPV3) transmission in those countries, along with WPV1 and 
WPV3 importation outbreaks, increased the total annual number of reported cases to more 
than 1000 until 2011 [3, 11]. During 2001–2009, polio outbreaks were reported in 38 
previously polio-free countries; WPV transmission persisted for ≥12 months in some of 
these countries because of health infrastructure weaknesses [12–17]. Repeated WPV 
exportation from reservoir countries into polio-free countries posed a major threat to the 
GPEI in 2009 (Figure 1). The GPEI Strategic Plan for 2010–2012 focused on bivalent OPV 
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(types 1 and 3, bOPV) as the preferred SIA vaccine, improved speed in outbreak 
confirmation and control, and enhanced community engagement [18, 19].
Progress during 2010–2011 was limited; the Independent Monitoring Board convened to 
assess progress warned in October 2011 that the revised target for interrupting global WPV 
transmission by the end of 2012 was unlikely to be reached [20]. In 2012, the WHA 
declared completion of polio eradication a “programmatic emergency for global public 
health” [21, 22]. The GPEI Emergency Action Plan for 2012–2013 [23] focused on 
improved commitment of governments down to the lowest levels, further enhanced 
community engagement, and a surge of technical support by the major GPEI partners for 
planning, implementation, supervision, and monitoring of GPEI activities. By early 2012, 
the 1-year absence of reported WPV cases in India underscored the technical feasibility of 
eradication.
Despite enhancements to routine immunization (RI) delivery systems in each endemic 
country, coverage had not improved substantially by 2012 [24]. As the risk for outbreaks of 
circulating type 2 vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPV2) [25] increased and the strategic 
path to eventual cessation of all use of OPVs was needed, the Polio Eradication and 
Endgame Strategic Plan 2013–2018 [26] provided comprehensive, long-term strategies to 
deliver a polio-free world by 2018.
This report summarizes progress made toward interruption of WPV transmission during 
2010–2013 and presents strategic considerations to address remaining challenges.
DETECTION OF WPV TRANSMISSION
Although paralysis is a rare outcome of WPV (and cVDPV) infections (<1%) [27], acute 
flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance has been the proven means of tracing WPV 
transmission [28]. AFP surveillance consists of detecting and investigating acute paralysis in 
children, including timely collection of fecal specimens and prompt testing in accredited 
laboratories of the Global Polio Laboratory Network (GPLN) [29–31]. Standardized GPEI 
performance indicators evaluate the quality of AFP surveillance and identify where WPV 
transmission might go undetected [30, 32]. The indicator used to assess whether surveillance 
is sufficiently sensitive to promptly detect WPV circulation is the annual proportion of AFP 
cases excluding WPV and VDPV cases and cases classified as polio-compatible, among 
children <15 years of age (nonpolio AFP [NPAFP]). Countries in WHO regions not certified 
as polio-free—the African and Eastern Mediterranean regions—should achieve annual 
NPAFP rates of ≥2 cases per 100,000 [32, 33]. To ensure ample and reliable laboratory 
analysis, ≥80% of AFP cases should have two stool specimens collected ≤14 days of 
paralysis onset, ≥24 hours apart, arriving in good condition at an accredited GPLN 
laboratory (“adequate” specimens). National data can mask heterogeneous subnational 
performance; we applied performance indicators to subnational areas [19] and assessed the 
proportion of the national population residing in subnational areas where both indicator 
targets were met.
Table 1 indicates the trends in countries meeting performance indicators at national and 
subnational levels during 2010–2013 among 29 countries in the two remaining endemic 
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regions with WPV cases during 2009–2013 and nine selected neighboring countries. 
Although most countries detect ≥2 NPAFP cases/100,000 children aged <15 years nationally 
and in a large proportion of first administrative subnational units (province/state), some 
exceptions occur in small countries (such as Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, and Djibouti), and 
in conflict-affected Central African Republic (CAR) and Syria. Inadequate specimen 
collection is a larger problem. Many countries fail to meet this indicator nationally or in a 
substantial proportion of subnational areas, including countries of Central Africa, and in the 
Horn of Africa. In 13 of the 38 countries reviewed, less than half of the population lives in 
areas that met both primary AFP surveillance indicators in 2013. Alternatively, some 
countries experienced recent improvements in performance indicators, most notably the 
Republic of the Congo (Congo) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In large 
countries, performance is better assessed at lower administrative levels (districts), since gaps 
can be masked when aggregated at a province/state level.
A high rate of evolution of polioviruses occurs at the nucleotide level (~1% per year) [34]. 
GPEI and GPLN take advantage of this rapid evolution rate by determining the sequence of 
the genomic region encoding the VP1 capsid protein for all non-Sabin-like polioviruses 
isolated (i.e., suspected of being WPV or VDPV), regardless of source [24]. The sequences 
provide molecular epidemiologic evidence for linkages among cases even over long 
geographic distances. Similarly, the VP1 sequences can be used to detect AFP surveillance 
gaps by identifying so-called “orphan” viruses, which differ from all other sequenced 
polioviruses by ≥1.5% in VP1 sequence coding. A difference of 1.5% implies 0.75–1.5 
years of transmission/evolution between the two viruses and that expected intervening 
paralytic cases were missed by the surveillance system. With a high proportion of orphans 
among WPV1 isolated from AFP cases, sequence analysis indicated that WPV1 cases were 
likely being missed by AFP surveillance as recently as during 2012–2013 in Afghanistan 
and Nigeria (Figure 2), as well as in Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Syria (S. Oberste, personal 
communication 2014).
Environmental surveillance [ES] (testing sewage samples for polioviruses) can be more 
sensitive than AFP surveillance, detecting WPV transmission that might occur in the 
absence of detected WPV-confirmed AFP cases if specimens are taken from converging 
drainage serving high-risk populations [35]. ES has been established in three currently polio-
endemic countries: Pakistan since 2009 (currently 29 sites in five provinces), Afghanistan 
since 2013 (currently nine sites in four provinces), and Nigeria since 2011 (currently 26 sites 
in eight states), as well as in one recent outbreak country (Kenya, 4 sites) and at least 24 
countries without active WPV transmission: India (24 sites in six states), Egypt (34 sites in 
11 cities), China (10 sites in 10 provinces), Australia (3 sites in 2 states) and multiple sites in 
20 countries of the European Region.
Active WPV1 transmission without detection of paralytic polio cases was identified by an 
extensive ES system in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza in 2013 [36, 37]. Genomic sequence 
analyses indicate that the WPV1 originated in Pakistan and was closely linked to WPV1 
isolated from two sewage specimens collected in December 2012 in Cairo, Egypt [38] and to 
WPV1 cases detected in 2013 in Syria [39, 40], signifying widespread circulation in the 
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Middle East during the end-2012–early-2013 (S. Oberste, S. Sharif, personal communication 
2014).
REPORTED WPV CASES
Overview
In 2009, 1604 WPV cases were reported by 23 countries (Figure 3). During 2010–2012, the 
number of reported WPV cases and the number of affected countries progressively declined 
compared with 2009 (Figures 1 and 3): 1352 reported cases in 20 countries in 2010, 650 
cases in 16 countries in 2011, and 223 cases in five countries in 2012. In 2013, cases 
increased to 416 and affected countries increased to 13. These numbers reflect different 
trends in transmission by WPV serotype among each endemic country and variability in the 
annual number and size of outbreaks after WPV importation (Table 2). The effects of 
implementation of national emergency plans were seen in Pakistan in 2012 and in Nigeria in 
2013. The number of reported polio-affected districts decreased globally by 74% from 481 
in 2009 to 126 in 2013 and among endemic countries, decreased 79%, from 304 to 63 
(Figure 4). In Pakistan, Afghanistan and Nigeria, the number of affected districts decreased 
by 75% from 248 in 2009 to 63 in 2013.
WPV1—In 2010, WPV1 cases were detected in 19 countries, including the four countries 
with endemic transmission of indigenous WPV (Table 2). Large outbreaks occurred in 2010 
in Tajikistan (and other former Soviet republics) and Congo. In 2011, WPV1 cases were 
detected in 16 countries. The last detected case in India occurred in January 2011. In 2012, 
WPV1 cases were detected in five countries and in 2013, in eight countries, including 
Pakistan, Afghanistan and Nigeria. In.
WPV3—In 2010, WPV3 cases were detected in seven countries, including the four endemic 
countries. As bOPV use increased during 2010–2012, WPV3 circulation decreased 
markedly. The last reported WPV3 case in Afghanistan had onset of paralysis April 11, 
2010; the last reported case in India occurred October 22, 2010. In 2011, WPV3 cases were 
detected in six countries, including Pakistan and Nigeria. In 2012, WPV3 cases were 
detected only in Pakistan and Nigeria; the latest reported case in Pakistan was associated 
with a WPV1 and WPV3 co-infection and occurred April 18, 2012. The most recent WPV3 
case detected globally was in Nigeria with onset November 10, 2012. The latest WPV3 
detected from any source was from a sewage sample collected in Lagos November 11, 2012.
WPV Cases in Endemic Countries
Pakistan—In 2010, 120 WPV1 cases and 24 WPV3 cases were reported (Table 2), 
increased from 61 WPV1 cases (one WPV3 co-infection) and 28 WPV3 cases reported in 
2009. In 2011, a 63% increase in WPV1 cases and a 97% decrease in WPV3 cases were 
reported. In 2012, a 71% decrease in WPV1 cases and no change in WPV3 cases were 
reported. In 2013, a 71% decrease of WPV1 cases and no WPV3 case (100% decrease) were 
reported. Compared to an overall 35% decrease in the number of reported cases during 
2010–2013, the number of affected districts fell by 43% from 40 in 2010 to 23 in 2013 
Wassilak et al. Page 5
J Infect Dis. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2015 October 21.
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
(Figure 4). The remaining areas of transmission are in Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
(FATA), central and southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province, and Karachi.
Afghanistan—In 2010, 17 WPV1 cases and 8 WPV3 cases were reported, compared with 
16 WPV1 cases (one WPV3 co-infection) and 22 WPV3 cases reported in 2009. In 2011, a 
370% increase in WPV1 cases and no WPV3 cases (100% decrease) were reported. In 2012, 
a 54% decrease in WPV1 cases was reported. In 2013, a further 62% decrease was reported. 
A 33% decrease occurred in the number of affected districts from 15 in 2010 to 3 in 2013. 
Although cross-border and indigenous transmission of WPV1 occurred through 2012 in the 
South Region bordering the Quetta reservoir in Pakistan, all WPV1 cases in 2013 in 
Afghanistan but one represent importations from Pakistan into the Eastern Region.
India—In 2010, 17 WPV1 cases and 24 WPV3 cases were reported, decreased from 80 
WPV1 cases and 661 WPV3 cases in 2009. A single WPV1 case was reported in 2011 with 
onset January 13. No WPV cases were detected in India in 2012 and 2013. India was 
removed from the WHO list of WPV-endemic countries in February 2012.
Nigeria—In 2010, 8 WPV1 cases and 13 WPV3 cases were reported, decreased from 75 
WPV1 cases and 313 WPV3 cases reported in 2009. In 2011, a 487% increase in reported 
WPV1 cases and a 15% increase in reported WPV3 cases occurred. In 2012, reported WPV1 
cases increased 119% compared to 2011 and WPV3 cases increased 27%. In 2013, reported 
WPV1 cases decreased 49% from 2012 and no WPV3 cases (100% decrease) were reported. 
Although three reservoir areas remained during 2010–2012, no WPV cases were detected in 
the northwest reservoir in 2013 nor was WPV isolated from sewage sampled in the 
northwestern city of Sokoto. The other reservoir areas are north-central states (primarily 
Kano) and the northeast (primarily Borno).
WPV Cases in Countries with Reestablished Transmission
Chad—After outbreaks of WPV3 imported from Nigeria in 2007, ongoing WPV3 
transmission was reestablished in Chad. Additionally, transmission continued after WPV1 
was imported from Nigeria in September 2010. In 2010, 11 WPV1 cases and 15 WPV3 
cases were reported, decreased from 64 WPV3 cases reported in 2009. In 2011, a 10.7-fold 
increase in WPV1 cases and a 95% decrease in WPV3 cases were reported. In 2012, 
reported WPV1 cases decreased by 96%, the most recent case having onset June 14, 2012; 
no WPV3 case was reported.
Angola—During 2005–2007, three separate WPV importations into Angola (one WPV3, 
two WPV1) WPV originated from India. WPV1 transmission was reestablished after the 
latest importation in 2007; when transmission became widespread in 2010, subsequent 
exportations occurred into DRC and Congo. During 2010, 33 WPV1 cases were detected, 
including in central Angola and at the eastern border with DRC, leading to spread to DRC. 
In 2011, WPV1 cases decreased 85% from 2010. The last indication of ongoing 
reestablished transmission was a cluster of four WPV1 cases in the southern province of 
Kuando-Kubango during January–March 2011. With local transmission occurring after a 
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new importation from DRC, the latest WPV1 case occurred in the northern province of Uige 
on July 7, 2011.
DRC—WPV1 cases occurred during 2006–2008 after WPV1 was introduced from Angola; 
no WPV1 case was detected in 2009 (although a linked case was detected in Burundi). 
During 2010, six genetically-linked WPV1 cases were identified in Katanga Province in 
southeastern DRC in addition to 94 other cases in outbreaks secondary to new importations. 
Two genetically distinct outbreaks occurred in 2011; 79 WPV1 cases reported in western 
provinces resulted from importations from Angola and Congo, and 14 WPV1 cases in the 
eastern provinces of Katanga and Maniema represented ongoing reestablished transmission. 
The last reported case occurred December 20, 2011.
WPV Outbreaks following Importation into Polio-Free Countries
Outbreaks that began in 2009 continued into 2010 in Mali, Mauritania, and Sierra Leone. 
Nine new outbreaks occurred in 2010 related to multiple importation events. Additional 
importation events occurred in Mali in 2010, and new outbreaks with WPV of Nigeria origin 
also occurred in Liberia, Niger, and Senegal. Large WPV1 outbreaks occurred in Tajikistan 
(with transmission to the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) 
and in Congo; both of these were associated with a substantial proportion of cases in persons 
aged ≥15 years [14, 42]. The Uganda outbreak was related to the 2009 transmission in 
Kenya. The Mali WPV3 2010 outbreak that continued into 2011 was not interrupted within 
6 months after confirmation. Aside from Kenya-Uganda cross-border transmission and the 
outbreak in Mali, all other 2010 outbreaks were controlled promptly.
In 2011, 11 WPV outbreaks occurred worldwide, including nine new importation events in 
eight countries and two outbreaks representing ongoing transmission from 2010 into 2011 
(WPV3 in Mali and WPV1 in Congo). The 2011 outbreak in Kenya represented 
transmission from Uganda of the WPV1 previously isolated in Kenya in 2009. The other 
importation events in 2011 occurred in China and in seven countries in Africa, including the 
last identified outbreaks of WPV3. The WPV outbreak in China was the first reported in the 
WHO Western Pacific Region since 1997 [43]. All new outbreaks in 2011 were controlled 
promptly.
In 2012, a single case in Niger was the only outbreak. The number of WPV cases in 
outbreaks after importation increased to 256 in five countries in 2013 (Figure 1). In Horn of 
Africa countries, the first identified case had onset in Somalia in April 2013 and spread 
resulted in 217 cases in Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia in 2013. More than 400,000 children 
aged <5 years reside in areas in Somalia controlled by antigovernment elements and 
inaccessible to vaccination efforts. Cases have since occurred in Ethiopia in January 2014 
and in Somalia in June 2014, indicating that the outbreak was not controlled promptly there 
and that transmission has been reestablished in Somalia. Four WPV1 cases were reported in 
Cameroon in 2013; the outbreak was not controlled promptly, with transmission continuing 
into 2014. Importation of WPV of Pakistan origin into Syria resulted in 35 cases in 2013 and 
one case to date in 2014 (and spread to Iraq in 2014) but transmission tentatively controlled.
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DISCUSSION
Despite setbacks, substantial progress toward global polio eradication has occurred in recent 
years. Reestablished transmission in four countries has been interrupted (the last case in 
Sudan was in 2009). As of July 22, 2014, no WPV3 case has been identified since 
November 2012, raising the possibility that both WPV2 and WPV3 transmission have been 
interrupted globally. In March 2014, the WHO South-East Asian Region joined the 
American, Western Pacific, and European Regions as being certified free of indigenous 
WPV. With this achievement, 80% of the world’s population now lives in WHO Regions 
certified as polio-free [44].
Indigenous WPV transmission appears to be restricted to fewer geographical areas within 
each of the three remaining endemic countries compared with any time previously. The 
reservoirs of indigenous WPV1 in Quetta in Balochistan, Pakistan, and in Sokoto and 
Zamfara states in northwest Nigeria, have not been active in 2013 or 2014 to date. The 
substantial decreases in the number of WPV cases and of affected states and districts in 
Nigeria were preceded by markedly improved SIA quality indicators in most areas [41, 45]. 
WPV transmission in Nigeria, as of July 2014, has been detected only in Kano and Borno 
states. As of July 22 2014, 99 cases have been reported in Pakistan compared with 21 cases 
at this time in 2013; five cases in Nigeria, compared with 35 cases, and eight cases in 
Afghanistan compared with three, respectively. Despite the 329% increase in case numbers 
in Pakistan in 2014, only 12 districts are polio-affected to date compared with 10 at this time 
in 2013.
One of the key tools contributing to this progress has been the introduction and widespread 
use of bOPV in SIAs since late 2009. Another contributing factor was the implementation of 
emergency action plans in WPV-affected countries. Key elements of national emergency 
plans included activities to 1) enhance government commitment to polio eradication and 
increase accountability at all administrative levels; 2) increase vaccination coverage through 
RI and SIAs (e.g., improved micro-planning, implementation of strategies to vaccinate 
nomadic and remote populations, enhanced monitoring of SIA quality); 3) improve partner 
coordination (e.g., polio control rooms at national and state levels); and 4) implement 
innovative approaches (e.g., implementation of short-interval additional dose SIAs, 
enhanced efforts to vaccinate children in transit and migrating). Since 2012, priority 
countries received considerably increased technical support and human resources, including 
the support provided by the international and national “Stop Transmission of Polio (STOP)” 
programs [46, 47].
Sensitive AFP surveillance is the “gold standard” to track WPV transmission and to allow 
early detection of and response to WPV importation into polio-free areas. Performance of 
AFP surveillance across polio-affected countries is varied. The “orphan” virus proportion of 
recent WPV isolates in several countries provides evidence of undetected transmission 
caused by deficiencies in AFP surveillance; the quality of AFP surveillance needs to be 
enhanced. ES is becoming an increasingly important supplemental tool for monitoring end-
stage progress in endemic countries and the maintenance of polio-free status [35].
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In 2014, the major challenge to the success of global polio eradication is an ongoing 
inability to access and vaccinate children in areas because of physical threats to the security 
of vaccinations teams. The increase in cases in 2013 and 2014 in Pakistan is the result of a 
ban on polio vaccination in North and South Waziristan, FATA; local community leaders 
have prevented vaccination of more than 350,000 children since June 2012. Ongoing 
military operations in Khyber Agency also limit access. Targeted attacks against polio 
workers and police officers assigned to protect them have compromised the implementation 
of SIAs in parts of FATA, KP province, and Karachi. Directed violence against vaccinators 
in Kano, Yobe, and Borno in early 2013 curtailed SIA implementation. Antigovernment 
elements continue to cause insecurity in Borno state and elsewhere in northern Nigeria. 
However, in Borno 100% were of children were inaccessible in March 2012 declining to 
16% in March 2014 [41]). The active conflict in Syria led to the immunity gaps that allowed 
the outbreak to occur and impeded early comprehensive outbreak response. WPV continues 
to be reimported from FATA into the Eastern Region of Afghanistan where access and 
security problems continue to affect the implementation of quality SIAs. During 2010–2012, 
the conflict in Afghanistan prevented vaccinators from safely accessing children in many 
areas of the Southern Region of Afghanistan. Systematic negotiations improved access to 
children during 2012–2013, which, together with successful efforts to improve the quality of 
SIAs, virtually interrupted indigenous WPV1 transmission. Despite this, antigovernment 
elements have again prevented vaccination of all children in Helmand province thus far in 
2014. Limitations of access for SIAs into parts of south-central Somalia remain. The 
ongoing WPV1 circulation in Cameroon (that affected Equatorial Guinea in early 2014) 
poses a serious risk for renewed spread into populations affected by insecurity, civil unrest 
and displacement in the CAR.
Complacency is the other major threat to GPEI’s success: gaps in program performance 
remain in some secure areas of Nigeria and Pakistan; serious potential consequences can 
result from decreased program performance during elections; and limited political 
commitment can result in low effectiveness of outbreak response performance. These risks 
are compounded by gaps in surveillance in polio-free areas and the continued threat of new 
international spread of WPV.
Managing these risks requires full national ownership of the eradication program in all 
affected countries, including full engagement of all relevant line ministries to local 
authorities. Urgently needed improvements in accessing and vaccinating children in insecure 
and conflict-affected areas will require enhancing the engagement of international bodies, 
religious leaders, and humanitarian actors to implement area-specific plans, generate greater 
community demand and participation, and adapt activities to local contexts.
On 5 May, 2014, under authority of the International Health Regulations (2005), the WHO 
Director-General declared renewed international spread of WPV in early 2014 a ‘Public 
Health Emergency of International Concern’ [48]. She issued Temporary Recommendations 
to reduce international exportation by having affected countries ensure/encourage that all 
residents and long-term visitors traveling from polio-affected countries receive an officially 
documented booster dose of polio vaccine within a year before departure. WHO appealed to 
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all member states to enhance surveillance and immunization activities and fully implement 
immunization recommendations for of travelers [49].
If international and national importation of WPV into polio-free areas can be prevented (or 
controlled quickly, if not), effective activities continued during political change, access to all 
children increased through negotiation and innovation, and activities not curtailed from 
insufficient funding or complacency, polio eradication can be completed in the near future. 
All evidence points to the technical and operational feasibility of eradication. At no time in 
the past has this been so close.
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